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Background: The diagnosis-related group-based prospective payment programme was introduced in Korea in
1997 as a pilot programme to control health spending. In July 2013, the programme was implemented
throughout the nation. The aim of our study is to evaluate the relationship between quality of care and
market competition following the introduction of the new payment system in Korea. Methods: We conduct an
observational analysis using National Health Insurance claim data from 2011 to 2014. We analyse data on re-
admission within 30 days, length of stay, and number of outpatient visits for 1742 hospitals and 821912 cases. We
use a generalized estimating equation model to evaluate readmission within 30 days and number of outpatient
visits and a multi-level regression model to assess length of stay. Results: Total readmission within 30 days is 10 727
(1.3%). High competition areas present a lower risk of readmission [odds ratio (OR): 0.95, P: 0.0277], a longer
length of stay (1%, P<0.0001), and an increased number of outpatient visits (Relative Risk: 1.11, P: 0.0011) as
compared with moderate competition areas. Risk of readmission is higher in low competition areas as compared
with moderate competition areas (OR: 1.21, P<0.0001). Conclusion: The effects of the introduction of the new
payment system differed by degree of market competition. Thus, evaluation about the effect of new payment
system on hospital performance should be measured in combination with the degree of hospital market structure.
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Introduction
In recent years, health spending growth has exceeded economicgrowth in many countries. This is the result of an overall
increased interest in health.1 To control health spending, a
diagnosis-related group (DRG) based payment programme was
suggested as a health care system in the USA. Following the intro-
duction of the DRG system in the USA, many countries have
adopted it and modified it based on their individual needs.2,3
In Korea, average annual growth in health spending and health
expenditures during 2000–12 increased faster than that of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Asia region (Asia region: 4.6%, Korea: 7.5%).1 The DRG
system was introduced in 1997 as a way to control health spending
and to improve health efficiency in Korea. The Korean-DRG system
was based on the US Yale Refined DRG system.4 The criteria for
DRG were selected by evaluating the variation in medical expend-
itures that were similar clinically as well as similar in consumption of
resources. Following the pilot programme, which lasted for several
years, the DRG system was implemented for seven disease groups in
2002 through voluntary participation. Recently, the DRG system was
implemented throughout the nation, resulting in changes for Korea’s
health care system. The implementation of the DRG system for
hospitals and clinics became mandatory on 1 July 2012 and for
general and tertiary hospitals on 1 July 2013. These changes in the
payment mechanisms for hospitals care affected competition among
hospitals5,6 primarily through hospital performance and quality of
care.7–10 In response to the new payment system, hospitals adopted
various cost-saving strategies and changed their medical health
behaviour. In addition, changes in hospital performance differed
according to degree of market competition. The differences in
market competition affected hospital behaviour and led to differ-
ences in quality of care.
Previous studies suggest that introduction of the health care
system influenced competition in the market.11 Further studies on
quality of care and market competition were conducted by many
other researchers12,13 and concerns regarding the introduction of the
DRG system and quality of care were noted.14 In addition, other
studies have found benefits to the DRG system, such as a reduction
in healthcare costs and length of stay (LOS).15,16
In Korea, many studies have been conducted on the association
between the quality of care and the DRG system.17–19 However, few
studies have been conducted after mandatory adoption of DRG
system in Korea. In addition, hospitals in Korea have undergone
dramatic changes within a few decades and studies on the effects
of market competition are needed.
Thus, the purpose of this study is to examine the association
between the effects of market competition and quality of care
following the introduction of the DRG system in Korea. We use
data on readmission within 30 days after discharge, number of
outpatient visits and LOS to measure quality of care and changes
in hospital behaviour.
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Methods
Database and data collection
We used National Health Insurance (NHI) claim data collected
during July 2011 to July 2014 for patients admitted to hospitals
due to haemorrhoids (Korean DRG codes: G1020, G1040, G1050
and G1060). Each DRG code is subdivided by severity of compli-
cation and comorbidity. We included clinic in our study because
more than 50% of patients were admitted to clinics. In Korea,
clinics have operating rooms and facilities for inpatients.
Additionally, we analysed data on readmission within 30 days
after discharge, LOS and number of outpatient visits within 30
days of admission from 1742 hospitals. Our analysis included
821 912 hospitalizations.
Variables
The outcome variable used in this study is readmission within
30 days after discharge for haemorrhoids. We identified the
patient’s first hospitalization and discharge in the calendar year as
the first index hospitalization and discharge. Next, we examined
whether readmission occurred within 30 days after the first index
day in the same hospital or another hospital. Furthermore, we
matched the patient’s primary diagnosis of the first hospitalization
and that of the readmission and defined it as a readmission. LOS was
measured using date of admission and date of discharge. We used a
log transformation for LOS to reflect the original scale of the skewed
data and to measure the relationship by estimating changes in the
dependent variable in response to per cent changes in the explana-
tory variable (for further details, see Supplementary data 1).20–23
Number of outpatient visits was defined as visiting an outpatient
clinic within 30 days before or after hospitalization, based on the day
of admission or discharge, respectively.
We extracted patient-level data and matched hospital-level data
for the hospital to which the patient had been admitted. Hospital-
level data included hospital type (tertiary hospital, general hospital,
hospital or clinic), ownership status (private or public), teaching
status (teaching or non-teaching), size (number of beds), case mix
index and hospital location (urban or rural). Data on the introduc-
tion of the DRG system was classified by newly introduced organ-
izations or continuously adopted organizations. Clinics and
hospitals were required to implement the DRG system from 1 July
2012. Both general hospitals and tertiary hospitals were required to
implement the DRG system from 1 July 2013. Newly introduced
organizations were defined as hospitals that participated in the
DRG system during the mandatory period, whereas hospitals that
had previously voluntarily participated in the DRG system were
classified as continuously adopted organizations. Human resources
(doctors, nurses and pharmacists) were included to reflect differ-
ences in hospital scale. Patient-level data included patient ID, sex,
age, patient clinical complexity level and year.
The Hirschmann–Herfindal Index (HHI) was used to reflect the
degree of market competition. HHI was calculated using patient
claim data from all hospitals using the following equation.
Hirschmann  Herfindal Index HHIð Þ ¼
Xn
i¼0
S2i
The HHI is the sum of squared market share of hospital under the
defined market. Market share Si is calculated using the total
discharged patients for haemorrhoid, i indicates each hospital and
n is the total number of hospitals in a specific market area, meaning
that high HHI indicates low market competition or hospital had a
dominant effect in the market area. To measure the different effects
of market competition, we categorized market competition as high,
moderate or low using quartiles of HHI.
Statistical analysis
The distribution of each categorical variable was examined by an
analysis of frequencies and percentages, and 2 tests were performed
to examine associations with readmission within 30 days. Analysis of
variance was also performed to compare the average values and
standard deviations for continuous variables. Generalized estimating
equation regression models were used to examine associations with
readmission within 30 days after discharge and number of outpatient
visits. Multi-level regression models were used to investigate the as-
sociation between LOS and each variable (Null model ICC: 0.685, for
further details, see Supplementary data 1).24,25 In addition, subgroup
analyses were performed according to the introduction of the DRG
system and type of hospital. All statistical analyses were performed
using SAS statistical software version 9.3. P-values < 0.05 were
considered indicative of statistically significant differences.
Results
The data used in this study consisted of 821 912 hospitalizations and
1742 hospitals. There were 10 727 (1.3%) cases of readmission
within 30 days after discharge. The average LOS was the shortest
in moderate competition areas, whereas low competition areas had
the longest LOS as compared with other areas. Number of
outpatient visits was highest in low competition areas and lowest
in moderate competition areas (table 1).
We used generalized estimating equation models to evaluate re-
admission within 30 days after discharge. Interestingly, the risk of
readmission was higher in low competition areas [odds ratio (OR):
1.21, P< 0.0001] as compared with moderate competition areas.
High competition areas had a lower risk of readmission (OR:
0.95, P-value: 0.0277) as compared with moderate competition
areas. LOS was slightly (1%) higher in high competition areas as
compared with moderate competition areas. Number of outpatient
visits was higher in both high and low competition areas as
compared with moderate competition areas (high competition
areas—relative risk (RR): 1.11, P-value: 0.0011; low competition
areas—RR: 1.06, P-value: 0.2485) (table 2).
According to the subgroup analysis of the introduction of the
DRG system, newly introduced organizations located in high and
low competition areas had a high risk of readmission within
30 days that was not statistically significant. LOS was significantly
decreased in high competition areas (2.7%, P: 0.0004). In the case
of number of outpatient visits, low competition areas had a lower
number of outpatient visits and high competition areas had a
higher outpatient visits (high competition area—RR: 1.15; low
competition area—RR: 0.98). Continuously adopted organizations
that voluntarily implemented the DRG system showed trends
similar to the main results. High competition areas presented a
lower risk of readmission, a higher LOS, and a higher number of
outpatient visits, all of which were statistically significant
(readmission—OR: 0.90; LOS—1%; number of outpatient
visits—RR: 1.09). In contrast with high competition areas, low
competition areas had a higher risk of readmission within 30
days and a higher number of outpatient visits (readmission—OR:
1.24; number of outpatient visits—RR: 1.06). The subgroup
analysis showed that clinics and hospitals displayed similar trends
for each outcome variable. Readmission was higher in low compe-
tition areas, whereas lower in high competition areas. LOS
increased by 0.64% to 1.50% in the high competition area.
Number of outpatient visits was higher in both the high and low
competition areas. Except for readmission, general and tertiary
hospitals showed similar trends in LOS and outpatient visits.
However, the impact on number of outpatient visits for general
and tertiary hospitals were higher in the low and high competition
areas; these findings were statistically significantly (table 3).
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Discussion
The introduction of a new payment system can affect a hospital’s
medical behaviour and may cause unexpected results according to
the degree of market competition.14 For example, hospitals located
in high competition areas will make an effort to attract patients and
hospitals located in low competition areas will focus on patient
durability (i.e. continuous care).26 The DRG system provides
medical services for certain diseases according to a fixed amount,
regardless of the type of hospital. Under the DRG system, patients
can select a hospital without considering the burden of cost and will
have the opportunity to choose their preferred hospital. In contrast,
the hospital may change its existing medical services or medical
behaviours.
Many previous studies have reported on the association between
quality of care and market competition. Some studies have suggested
that competition has a negative or unclear association with quality of
care,27,28 whereas others have suggested that competition induces
better quality of care or is, at least, not associated with adverse
effects.12,29,30 Although some studies show that competitive area
has better quality of care,9 other studies suggested that it might be
associated with supplier induced demand in Korea.31,32 However,
these studies did not measure other effects, such as spillover
effects, under the DRG system. Furthermore, there have not been
any studies conducted on the association between competition and
quality of care in Korea after introduction of the DRG system. To
investigate the changes in the Korean healthcare system following
the introduction of the DRG system, we examined the association
between market competition and quality of care.
In our study, hospitals located in high competition areas had a
lower risk of readmission as compared with those in moderate com-
petition areas. Because readmission within 30 days is suggested as an
indicator of quality of care, hospitals in high competition areas made
an effort to reduce readmission.33,34 To maintain quality of care,
hospitals provided further clinical care in the hospitalization or
outpatient clinic. It might induce to increasing of LOS and
number of outpatient visits. Increasing number of outpatient
would be considered as a spillover effect. To control readmission,
hospitals in high competition area would be provided additional
clinical care in outpatient clinic, it lead to unintended results of
Table 1 Characteristics of outcome variable, patients, hospital and regional level
Total High competition Moderate competition Low competition P-value
Main interest
HHI 449.86 352.46 217.20 13.01 377.43 103.95 1156.57 449.19 <.0001
Outcome variable
Readmission 10727 (1.3) 3291 (1.2) 6347 (1.3) 1089 (1.4) 0.0001
LOSa 3.00 1.80 3.03 1.78 2.96 1.82 3.19 1.73 <.0001
Number of outpatient visits 3.95 2.72 4.26 2.76 3.70 2.64 4.38 2.90 <.0001
Hospital characteristics (n=1742)
Hospital type
Clinic 1003 (57.6) 280 (64.7) 583 (55.1) 140 (55.8) 0.0261
Hospital 410 (23.5) 90 (20.8) 261 (24.7) 59 (23.5)
General hospital 284 (16.3) 57 (13.2) 182 (17.2) 45 (17.9)
Tertiary hospital 45 (2.6) 6 (1.4) 32 (3.0) 7 (2.8)
CMI 0.93  0.37 0.90  0.37 0.95  0.37 0.91  0.34 0.0448
Number of 100 beds 148.12  252.20 113.31  189.99 160.63  276.84 155.47  231.79 0.0039
Number of doctor per 100 beds 11.63  12.58 11.51  14.01 12.27  12.60 9.15  9.20 0.0021
Number of nurse per 100 beds 14.56  19.42 11.57  17.72 16.60  20.66 11.09  15.31 <.0001
Number of pharmacist 1.77  7.74 0.93  3.21 2.20  9.49 1.36  3.97 0.0104
Ownership status
Private 1704 (97.8) 423 (97.7) 1040 (98.3) 241 (96.0) 0.1137
Public 38 (2.2) 10 (2.3) 18 (1.7) 10 (4.0)
Introduction of DRG
Newly adopted organization 868 (49.8) 242 (55.9) 515 (48.7) 111 (44.2) 0.0064
Continuously applied organization 874 (50.2) 191 (44.1) 543 (51.3) 140 (55.8)
Teaching status
Teaching 146 (8.4) 24 (5.5) 101 (9.6) 21 (8.4) 0.0316
Non-teaching 1596 (91.6) 409 (94.5) 957 (90.5) 230 (91.6)
Hospital location
Urban 1497 (85.9) 368 (85.0) 936 (88.5) 193 (76.9) <.0001
Rural 245 (14.1) 65 (15.0) 122 (11.5) 58 (23.1)
Patients characteristics
Sex
Male 473699 (57.6) 154 145 (57.5) 273 415 (57.7) 46 139 (57.5) 0.3466
Female 348 213 (42.4) 113 727 (42.5) 200 427 (42.3) 34 059 (42.5)
Age 42.27  14.33 42.05  14.38 42.34  14.26 42.62  14.59 <.0001
PCCL
0 810317 (98.6) 264 959 (98.9) 466 236 (98.4) 79 122 (98.7) <.0001
1 10453 (1.3) 2603 (1.0) 6930 (1.5) 920 (1.2)
2 1142 (0.1) 310 (0.1) 676 (0.1) 156 (0.2)
Year
Period 1 (July 2011 to June 2012) 281 783 (34.3) 52 719 (19.7) 194 936 (41.1) 34 128 (42.6) <.0001
Period 2 (July 2012 to June 2013) 274 716 (33.4) 108 858 (40.6) 142 500 (30.1) 23 358 (29.1)
Period 3 (July 2013 to July 2014) 265 413 (32.3) 106 295 (39.7) 136 406 (28.8) 22 712 (28.3)
Total 821912 (100.0) 267 872 (32.6) 473 842 (57.7) 80 198 (9.8) <.0001
(unit: n/mean, %/SD)
CMI, case mix index; PCCL, patient clinical complexity level.
a: Length of stay
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increasing outpatient visits. This scenario would be considered a
spillover effect of the DRG system. In contrast, hospitals in low
competition areas will not make significant efforts to improve
quality of care because patients have few options for hospitals as
compared with other competition areas.
Regarding the result of subgroup analysis by introduction of the
DRG system, readmission was differed from the competitive status.
Hospitals in high competition area that have recently adopted the
DRG system will make an effort to reduce LOS for hospitalized
patients. Under the DRG system, reimbursement differed by
average LOS even though the amount was fixed. Hospital would
be preferable to maintain the threshold of average LOS due to it
was more beneficial. This may be connected with short LOS. In
addition, postoperative care would be conducted in an outpatient
clinic rather than requiring re-hospitalization; it might induce to
increase in number of outpatient visits. This phenomenon might
be observed during the introductory stages of the implementation
of the DRG system; however, the results may be different after the
settlement of the system. We found different results for readmission
for the group of continuously adopted organizations. Hospitals in
high competition areas will attempt to control quality of care, which
might lead to a reduction in the rate of readmission within 30 days.
Furthermore, to maintain quality of care, LOS increased slightly for
postoperative care during hospitalization. On the contrary,
outpatient care for postoperative care increased in order to reduce
readmission. These results suggest that there are impacts of the im-
plementation of the DRG system.
In low competition areas, there were no differences in trend for
risk of readmission within 30 days based on the timing of the intro-
duction of the DRG system. Because there were no changes in the
quality of care in hospitals located in low competition areas, there
may be an increased risk of readmission within 30 days regardless of
timing of the introduction of the DRG system. In addition, number
of outpatient visits was lower for newly adopted organization located
in low competition areas. But, after the stabilization of the DRG
system, these hospitals increased the number of outpatient visits
and readmission. This is because that hospital can learn from their
experiences with the DRG system and discover the options that will
provide the highest profits.
The new payment system is expected to bring changes to the
health system. However, the impact of the payment system should
be considered together with the specific environment of the health
Table 2 The association of HHI on hospital readmission, LOS and number of outpatient visits
Readmission LOSa Number of outpatient visits
Main interest
High competition 0.95 0.0277 0.0100 <0.0001 1.11 0.0011
Moderate competition 1.00 Ref — 1.00 —
Low competition 1.21 <0.0001 0.0002 0.9451 1.06 0.2485
Hospital characteristics
Hospital type
Clinic 0.35 <0.0001 0.3025 <0.0001 0.90 0.5215
Hospital 0.71 0.0019 0.0343 0.3422 0.69 0.0128
General hospital 0.60 <0.0001 0.1075 <0.0001 0.72 0.0039
Tertiary hospital 1.00 Ref — 1.00 —
CMI 1.54 <0.0001 0.2607 <0.0001 0.90 0.3617
Number of 100 bedsb 1.01 0.6525 0.0003 0.0015 0.91 0.0036
Number of doctor per 100 bedsb 0.95 <0.0001 0.0082 <0.0001 0.93 0.0018
Number of nurse per 100 bedsb 1.04 <0.0001 0.0005 0.4045 0.99 0.3945
Number of pharmacist 1.00 0.7499 0.0020 0.2786 1.02 0.0012
Ownership status
Private 1.70 0.0173 0.0635 0.2243 1.48 0.0004
Public 1.00 Ref — 1.00 —
Introduction of DRG
Newly adopted organization 1.06 0.2242 0.0829 <0.0001 0.89 0.0325
Continuously applied organization 1.00 Ref — 1.00 —
Teaching status
Teaching 1.00 Ref — 1.00 —
Non-teaching 1.08 0.2626 0.0757 0.061 0.80 0.0033
Hospital location
Urban 1.01 0.8960 0.0527 0.0207 0.92 0.6375
Rural 1.00 — Ref — 1.00 —
Patients characteristics
Sex
Male 1.16 <0.0001 0.0338 <0.0001 0.97 <0.0001
Female 1.00 — Ref — 1.00 —
Age 1.01 <0.0001 0.0018 <0.0001 1.00 <0.0001
LOS 1.10 <0.0001 1.04 <0.0001
PCCL
0 1.00 — Ref — 1.00 —
1 1.30 0.0001 0.2169 <0.0001 0.85 0.0045
2 1.60 0.0008 0.5326 <0.0001 0.56 <0.0001
Year
Period 1 (July 2011 to June 2012) 1.00 — Ref — 1.00 —
Period 2 (July 2012 to June 2013) 0.98 0.5326 0.0360 <0.0001 1.03 0.0159
Period 3 (July 2013 to July 2014) 0.90 0.0001 0.0614 <0.0001 1.04 0.0036
Goodness of fit (QIC or AIC) 109 797.6 215 278.3 1571743.68
(unit: OR, estimate, RR, P-value)
CMI, case mix index; PCCL, patient clinical complexity level.
a: Estimates are the results of log transformation and interpretable as percentage changes.
b: Per 10% increased in 30 days readmission and number of outpatient visits.
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system of each country. In Korea, the DRG system was implemented
as an alternative to the fee-for-service strategy, which was different
from the European countries that had adopted global budget
systems. Thus, the effects of DRG system may be different for
Korea. The DRG payment system in Korea created more profitability
for hospitals because the reimbursement level under the DRG system
was greater on average than that under the fee-for-service system.4
This reduced the number of disputes regarding the mandatory
adoption of the DRG system.
However, many health providers still believe that the reimburse-
ment level under the DRG system is too low, and this belief became
predominant following the mandatory adoption of the DRG
system.4 Consequently, health care providers may attempt to
compensate for any decrease in profit due to the DRG system by
discharging patients earlier than expected (or needed) to potentially
induce an increase in the use of other facilities or in outpatient visits.
Spillover effect may appear through the increasing of outpatient
visits.
In addition, the impact of introduction of DRG system was
different by competitive status. Therefore, the expansion or devel-
opment of a new reimbursement system must be implemented more
carefully considering such differences. First, a suitable index for
quality of care under the DRG system should be developed.
Indicators for quality of care should be created for predictable re-
admission as well as for measuring actual changes in medical
services. Second, the impact of the DRG system should be assessed
over the long term to evaluate its impact on quality of care. Third, an
appropriate incentive programme that is based on quality indicators
is needed to introduce for improving quality of care in DRG system.
Finally, it may be worthwhile to consider the introduction of new
payment system as an alternative strategy to the DRG system, such as
a bundled payment system that provides a fixed cost during a
specific period and includes inpatient and outpatient health care
services.
Our study has several limitations. First, we used claim data that
did not measure certain characteristics of the patients, such as
education level or income level, which could affect readmission.
Second, our study included patients admitted for haemorrhoids;
however, the results might vary for other DRG diseases. Third, we
lacked an official definition of the hospital market in Korea; hence,
our study relied on administrative districts as markets. Because our
markets were defined as geographical areas, further studies will be
required following the designation of official markets.
However, despite several limitations, our study has strengths.
First, to the best of our knowledge, our study was the first to
evaluate market competition and quality of care after the introduc-
tion of the DRG system in Korea. Second, we used NHI claim data
and included a large sample of patients and hospitals regarding cases
of haemorrhoids. Third, our study is helpful as a short-term
evaluation of the introduction of the DRG system in Korea.
Finally, our study examined changes in hospitals by market compe-
tition, which may provide insight to policymakers interested in the
expansion of the DRG system in the future.
In conclusion, our study showed that the effects of the introduc-
tion of the DRG system differed by to degree of market competition.
Generally, hospitals in high competition areas provided a high
quality of care. However, the timing of introduction of DRG
system affected quality of care, as we found different results
following its implementation. Under the DRG system, a spillover
effect was observed through the indirect indicator of quality of
care irrespective of competitive status. Policymakers should
consider two aspects for future payment systems—the inclusion of
an alternative strategy as well as a new indicator for quality of care.
In addition, a regular evaluation of the DRG system will be needed
to improve quality of care and health efficiency.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at EURPUB online.
Table 3 Subgroup analysis of outcome variable according to DRG
Readmission LOSa Number of outpatient visits
Introduction of DRG system
Newly adopted organization
High competition 1.01 0.8311 0.0278 0.0004 1.15 <0.0001
Moderate competition 1.00 — Ref — 1.00 —
Low competition 1.05 0.5222 0.0086 0.6474 0.98 0.0136
Continuously adopted organization
High competition 0.90 0.0001 0.0100 <0.0001 1.09 <0.0001
Moderate competition 1.00 — Ref — 1.00 —
Low competition 1.24 <0.0001 0.0032 0.3431 1.06 <0.0001
Type of hospital
Clinic
High competition 0.98 0.6154 0.0064 0.0016 1.09 <0.0001
Moderate competition 1.00 — Ref — 1.00 —
Low competition 1.07 0.1457 0.0028 0.3928 1.03 <0.0001
Hospital
High competition 0.99 0.7468 0.0150 <0.0001 1.05 <0.0001
Moderate competition 1.00 — Ref — 1.00 —
Low competition 1.70 <0.0001 0.0177 0.1077 1.44 <0.0001
General hospital
High competition 0.97 0.6825 0.0072 0.4300 1.13 <0.0001
Moderate competition 1.00 — Ref — 1.00 —
Low competition 0.93 0.4893 0.0085 0.7388 1.02 0.0746
Tertiary hospital
High competition 1.02 0.9067 0.0381 0.2711 1.07 0.0050
Moderate competition 1.00 — Ref — 1.00 —
Low competition 1.20 0.4314 0.0806 0.1772 1.13 0.0002
(unit: OR, P-value)
Adjusted for type of hospital, CMI, number of beds, number of doctor per 100 beds, number of nurse per 100 beds, number of pharmacist,
introduction of DRG, teaching status, city, sex, age, LOS and PCCL
a: Estimates are the results of log transformation and interpretable as percentage changes.
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Key points
 The introduction of new payment system may change
hospital behaviour.
 Changes in hospital behaviour may vary by degree of
competitiveness.
 Policymakers should consider the degree of market competi-
tiveness when determining whether to maintain or expand
the DRG system.
 We suggest that a quality measurement index should be
developed to improve quality of care.
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